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NOTES
STOCKBROKERAGE BANKRUPTCIES:
IMPLEMENTING CCS
The paperwork logjam' which currently cripples securities market
transactions will be eliminated on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) with the advent of the Central Certificate Service (CCS).2
Because the new system will, for the most part, replace the physical
transfer of securities with automated bookkeeping entries, its imple-
mentation has occasioned revision of existing rules governing the
custody and transfer of securities.3
Still to be amended, however, is section 60e of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act,4 which conditions the right of a cash customer to reclaim
his fully-paid securities, in the event of a stockbrokerage bankruptcy,
upon physical identification of his property. One response to the new
transfer service would entail making all parties general creditors be-
cause they relied on the broker's credit. But there are compelling
policy reasons for making at least one exception; cash customers should
continue to be distinguished from margin customers-not only be-
cause of ownership arising out of full payment, but because of their
potential for weakening CCS. And although customers with free
credit balances should receive increased protection to encourage them
1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1968, at 67, col. 6. See Jolls, Can We Do Without Stock Certifi-
cates? A Look at the Future, 23 Bus. LAw. 909 (1968).
Such undesirable consequences of the administrative backlog as the inability of
broker-dealers to fill orders within applicable time limits will hopefully be eliminated.
1 SEC, REPORT ON THE SPECUAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MAnEnrs, pt. I, at 424-25 (1963) [herein-
after cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
2 Implementation of CCS began on June 28, 1968, and was completed on February 24,
1969. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1969, at 53, col. 1. "In 'Full Activation' eligible listed issues
are activated for broker to broker delivery at the rate of 5 issues per day, alphabetically
by corporate name." Letter from James E. Buck, Executive Assistant for Civic and Gov-
ernmental Affairs for the New York Stock Exchange, November 11, 1968, on file with the
Cornell Law Review.
3 The SEC, for example, has specifically amended its own rules to accommodate CCS.
The NYSE has successfully promoted the passage of legislation (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-320) in all but three states effecting changes in provisions of the stock transfer laws
which formerly required actual physical delivery of certificates evidencing ownership. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7896 (May 26, 1966); letter from James E. Buck,
supra note 2.
4 11 U.S.C. § 96(e) (1964).
STOCKBROKERAGE BANKRUPTCIES
to leave their funds with the broker,5 that protection must be found
outside the Bankruptcy Act.
I
CONDUCr OF THE CUSTOMER'S ACCOUNT
A. Segregation Rules and Systems
Customers' securities in the possession of NYSE member firms
are protected from improper hypothecation by the Exchange's rules
and policies on dealing with customer accounts., In particular, rule
402 requires segregation and clear identification of customers' fully
paid and excess margin securities.7
To comply with these rules, brokers use two basic types of segre-
gation systems: "individual" and "bulk." In the former, each stock cer-
tificate on deposit with the firm is either registered in the customer's
name, or is held in street name8 and identified by a tab or by filing in
an envelope bearing his name.9 Bulk segregation is prevalent, especially
among larger broker-dealers. Under this system, which requires that
all certificates maintained therein be in street name,10 a member firm
places certificates not registered in the names of its customers in a
common depository or "box." No indication of ownership appears on
the individual certificates. Each customer-owner of a given security
5 Free credit balances may arise in many ways, but under no circumstances is the
customer with a cash claim adequately protected in the event of bankruptcy. For example,
a cash customer may deposit money. with the broker with instructions to buy specified
securities, or with the understanding that instructions will follow. If bankruptcy occurs
before a purchase is made, the customer might not be able to reclaim his money for one
of two reasons: He does not fit within the definition of a cash customer in § 60e(l) since
he is not immediately entitled to the possession of securities or he cannot meet the physi-
cal identification requirements of § 60e(4). See Hearings on HR. 6789 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1147 (1964). Although brokers may establish separate bank
accounts for their customers' free credit balances, commingling of indistinguishable funds
may still occur. 3 W. CoL uxa, BANKRUPTCY 60.75, at 1192 n.1l (14th ed. 1967).
6 2 CCH NEw YoRK STOCK EXcHANGE GumE 2401-11 [hereinafter cited as NYSE
GuIDE].
7 Excess margin securities are the securities in a margin account not thought necessary
to secure a customer's indebtedness. This has been interpreted to mean those securities in
excess of 140% of the customer's debit balance. Id. 2402.70.
8 I.e., the broker's name or that of another broker. Certificates thus registered and
indorsed in blank are freely transferrable. They are utilized particularly in trading ac-
counts where indorsement by the customer in each transaction would be burdensome.
9 See 3 CollITER, supra note 5, 60.74, at 1183.
10 2 NYSE GumE, supra note 6, 2402.60.
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theoretically has an undivided proportional interest in all certificates
of that issue held by the firm in bulk segregation. Under both systems
of segregation, the rules forbid the pledging of a customer's securities
without his authorization.1 A margin customer's blanket consent is
sufficient, but the cash customer's authorization must relate specifically
to the securities sought to be pledged.12
On the other hand, there is no requirement that the broker
segregate or seek authorization to use free credit balances-the cash
owed to customers, and to which they have an immediate unrestricted
right of withdrawal.13
B. The Central Certificate Service
The New York Stock Exchange has had a central clearing system
in operation for some time, but CCS will greatly expand the present
system.'- Member firms transmit most of their proprietary and non-
proprietary securities to the central depository; 15 the securities are
then registered in the name of "Cede & Co.," a nominee of Stock
Clearing Corporation.16 The registered certificates, converted to large
denominations, are then, with the exception of a small CCS working
supply, deposited in custodian banks.2 All subsequent transactions
11 Id. 2402(b), (d).
12 Id.
13 Virtually the only restriction upon the broker's use of these funds is SEC rule
15c3-2, which requires only that a written statement be sent to the customer, at least once
every three months, of the amount owed him, including a notice that the funds are not
segregated and may be used in the broker's business. Prior to the recent promulgation
of this rule, brokers were not even required to notify customers that their funds were
used in firm operations. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7325 (May 27, 1964).
Free credit balances are the source of millions of dollars of interest-free capital which
brokers use to finance loans to their other customers. "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., for example, in its annual report to the Commission for 1961 stated that on
May 26, 1961, it held approximately $233 million in free credit balances. This is by far the
largest firm in the country, but other firms hold free credit balances in amounts running
into millions of dollars:' 1 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 394.
On November 1, 1968, Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc. held $41,419,965 in free credit
balances, representing 18% of the firm's total current liabilities. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1968, at 59.
14 The present system involves netted position changes settled through a clearing
house, Stock Clearing Corporation (SCC). This netting process eliminates only about 30%
of physical deliveries. Stock Clearing Corporation, Central Certificate Service (CCS): Out-
line of Major Operational Functions of Central Method for Handling Securities 2 (October,
1967) [hereinafter cited as SCC Outline].
15 Included will be fully paid and excess margin securities, as well as margined but
unhypothecated shares.
16 Phillip L. West, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange, Memorandum to
Secretaries of Domestic Listed Companies Re: CCS--Central Certificate Service.
17 SCC Outline, supra note 14, at 3.
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must be cleared through the central system's computer accounting
facilities, with appropriate adjustments being made in the accounts
of the members involved. Except when specifically requested, no
physical transfer of securities takes place. If a customer requests regis-
tration in his own name and individual segregation, the clearing mem-
ber simply instructs CCS to debit appropriately his member account
and to forward a "Cede & Co." certificate from the CCS working
supply to the transfer agent for registration in the customer's name.
Similarly, pledges of shares by brokers to obtain loans to finance their
customers' margin accounts are accomplished by a simple bookkeeping
entry, transferring the securities to the account of the pledgee bank.'8
CCS will dramatically increase the efficiency of securities trans-
fers. There will also be an important secondary effect upon segregation
systems: Only bulk segregation will be available to a member desiring
to utilize the service. Firms that presently individually segregate their
customers' fully paid or excess margin securities will be obliged to
adopt the bulk method. 19 Furthermore, segregation will be of record
only-the securities themselves will be held by CCS. Free credit
balances, however, will be unaffected20 by CCS since they are not
maintained within the system.
The interaction of this new system and the Bankruptcy Act should
be examined with a view to determining whether the Act can be effec-
tively applied under this altered framework for transfers.
II
SEGrION 60e
A. Legislative History
The 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 2' were designed to
bring uniformity to the chaotic administration of bankrupt estates
under widely divergent and often conflicting state rules. Section 60e
18 Allocation on the record books is to have the same effect as if the pledged shares
were actually delivered, but the pledgee may still ask to have certificates representing
pledged collateral physically transferred to it by the custodian bank. SCC Outline, supra
note 14, at 4.
19 See Stock Clearing Corporation, Central Certificate Service: Operating Procedures
for Clearing Members 3 (revised April, 1968).
20 For example, cash dividends declared on stock held within CCS will be paid to
"Cede & Co." and disbursed immediately to the clearing member. Id. at 19; SCC Outline,
supra note 14, at 4.
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 21-29, 32, 33, 35, 41-55, 62, 63, 65-70, 72-81, 91-96, 101-12, 203(b),
403(j), 501-1103 (1964); 18 U.S.C. §§ 151, 3057, 3284 (1964).
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was specifically added to standardize the liquidation rules applicable
to the bankrupt stockbroker's assets and to improve the position of
margin customers. 22 Under the then-prevailing "New York rule," the
margin customer was thought of as the owner of stock in the broker's
possession.23 Stock certificates were considered fungible, and the mar-
gin customer could therefore claim his securities, subject to a pledge
for the unpaid balance, by merely showing that he was entitled to
shares of the same issue as those found in the bankrupt's custody.24
However, if the broker no longer had the same or similar stock, the
customer's reclamation claim failed and he became only a general
creditor. Such a result was unfair in most cases since recovery was a
function of the irrelevant fact that a broker-dealer had misappropriated
one issue of securities but not another.
The members of the National Bankruptcy Conference, 25 the drafts-
men of the new subdivision, thought that distribution among margin
customers as a class should not depend upon the fortuitous circum-
stance of whether or not the broker retained a certain type of stock.26
Accordingly, their express intent was that, unless the certificate was
"specifically allocated or physically set aside, it must be thrown into
the fund for distribution to all customers of the single class."'2 7 In
effect, the "New York rule"-premised on ownership-was rejected,
at least with respect to margin customers, and the so-called "Massachu-
setts rule," which treated the relationship between stockbroker and
customer as that of debtor and creditor, was adopted instead.28 Equality
of distribution among margin customers pervades both the history and
the ultimate form of section 60e.
For reasons not apparent from the legislative history, however,
unequal distribution remained among cash customers; they continued
22 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACr, H.R.
REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1937). See also Gilchrist, Stockbrokers' Bankruptcies.
Problems Created By The Chandler Act, 24 MINN. L. REv. 52, 57 n.29 (1939); McLaughlin,
Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 369, 395-
98 (1937); Note, The Bankrupt Stockbroker: Section 60(e) of the Chandler Act, 39 COLUM.
L. RFv. 485, 490 nA1 (1939).
23 Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365 (1908).
24 Id.; Duel v. Hollins, 241 U.S. 523 (1916).
25 For an interesting description of the origin and operation of the Conference, see
McLaughlin, supra note 22, at 376-77.
26 Housz CommEE ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS oF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
193 (Comm. Print 1936).
27 Id.
28 Note, supra note 22, at 496. For articulation of the drafters' "creditor" approach,
see Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before the House Comm. on the judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 125-26 (1937).
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to be entitled to reclamation in certain narrowly defined situations.29
The drafters appear to have assumed that their desire to promote dis-
tributive equality of all customers by treating them as creditors inter
se would not be frustrated by allowing reclamation to those few cash
customers who could comply with the much stricter identification
requirements of the new statute.8 0 This assumption was valid since
there was then no segregation requirement among the New York
Stock Exchange rules governing the conduct of customers' accounts.3 '
Barring voluntary segregation by the broker, therefore, few customers
would properly be able to identify their securities even if they had not
been misappropriated.
B. Operation
In broad outline, section 60e provides for a three-tiered system of
distribution: (1) Cash customers32 are entitled to reclaim their identi-
fiable cash and securities, apparently on the theory that they are still
owners of specific property; (2) those cash customers who cannot iden-
tify their propertys and all margin customers share to the extent of
their individual net claims against the bankrupt stockbroker in a fund
comprised of all customers' property not reclaimed; and (3) customers
whose claims are not satisfied out of the fund participate with the
general creditors in the residue of the estate.
Under subdivision (2), all customers, except those cash customers
who are able to specifically identify their property in the manner
described in subdivision (4), are entitled to share pro rata, based upon
their "net equities,"3 4 in a "single and separate fund." The fund is
29 The primary focus of the drafters was upon the rights of margin customers. See
Gilchrist, supra note 22, at 57 n.29.
30 It may be contended that the broker is the bailee of fully paid securities held in
safekeeping for his customers. However, for the view that even the cash customer who
fails to insure that his securities are segregated has in fact trusted the credit of the broker
and so become a creditor, see McLaughlin, supra note 22, at 397.
31 See 1 W. BLACK, STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCKBROKERS & CusTomERs 880-85 (1940).
32 "Customers" generally are persons with claims on account of securities received,
acquired or held by the stockbroker from or for their accounts. "Cash customers," how-
ever, are only those customers entitled to immediate possession of their securities without
further payment to the broker. Query whether a customer not entitled to immediate
possession of fully paid securities but with a free credit balance in his account is also a
"cash customer."
3 "Property" is defined in subdivision (1) to include cash and securities, whether
or not negotiable.
84 The "net equity" of a customer's account is his net claim against the broker, based
on the liquidation price of his securities on the date of bankruptcy, and after excluding
any specifically identifiable securities subject to reclamation under paragraph (4).
1969]
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comprised of all property at any time received, acquired or otherwise
held by the stockbroker from or for the account of his customers, in-
cluding the proceeds of all customers' property rightfully transferred
or unlawfully converted by the stockbroker.35 If the "single and sepa-
rate fund" is not sufficient to pay in full the claims of the preferred
customer-creditors, they are entitled to share in the residue of the
estate with the general creditors.
Finally, subdivision (4) provides for the determination of which
securities are specifically identifiable and therefore subject to reclama-
tion. Neither form of property, cash or securities, is reclaimable unless
the property either remained in its identical form in the stockbroker's
possession until the date of bankruptcy or was allocated or physically
set aside for the customer more than four months prior thereto.
C. Diminished Effectiveness: Problems Posed by Cash Balances, Bulk
Segregation Systems and CCS
Section 60e fails to define adequately the circumstances under
which free credit balance cash can be reclaimed. Cash is theoretically
subject to reclamation because it is expressly included in the 60e(l)
definition of reclaimable property. However, the specified identifica-
tion requirements of 60e(4) are virtually impossible to satisfy with
respect to cash claims because there are no NYSE rules requiring
segregation of free credit balances. Since such cash is usually com-
mingled with other funds in the brokers' operating accounts, the right
of reclamation is largely illusory.8 6 Moreover, free credit balances will
be outside the CCS system, 7 so no change is impending. However,
35 Some confusion, with respect to the property to be included in this fund,
is caused by the punctuation in paragraph (2). Because of the insertion of a
comma after "customers" in the second line and after "stockbroker" in the fifth
line and because of the failure to insert a comma after "subdivision" in the
fourth line, it might be urged that the fund in which customers are entitled to
share would not include the "proceeds of all customers' property rightfully trans-
ferred or unlawfully converted by the stockbroker" and that customers whose
property was so transferred or converted should be relegated to the position of
general creditors.
3 CoLLIER, supra note 5, 60.73, at 1171.
Both the previous drafts of this paragraph and the language of paragraph (4), how-
ever, would seem to indicate the intent that such "proceeds" be included, and that the
customers affected share, in the "single and separate fund." Id. 60.73, at 1171 n.17.
36 A New York Stock Exchange attorney expressed to an investigating House subcom-
mittee his doubt that free credit balances are reclaimable under the present statute. See
Hearings on H.R. 6789, supra note 5, at 1147.
37 Cash dividends on stock held within the system will be paid directly to the clear-
ing member for transfer to the customer or his account. See Stock Clearing Corporation,
Central Certificate Service: Operating Procedures For Clearing Members, supra note 19, at
19 and note 20 supra.
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requiring segregation to protect the customer under 60e(4) would
seriously impair the industry's use of a valuable source of cash; on
balance, it is an unacceptable solution.38 To safeguard both debtor
and creditor, the concept of reclamation with its attendant require-
ment of physical identification must be discarded, and: priorities of
distribution should be established on some other basis grounded in
commercial fact.
Reclamation of securities held in bulk segregation systems seems
no more useful as a means of distributing assets than does recovery of
individual cash balances from brokers' accounts. Specific identification
in either instance is both difficult and irrational as a basis for establish-
ing priorities of distribution, Practices vary, but generally the broker's
stock records are the" only means of identifying an individual cus-
tomer's interest in the mass. Although NYSE counsel has stated that
securities segregated in this manner are sufficiently identified by al-
location in the records to subject them to reclamation under 60e(4)8 9
ownership of physically identifiable shares appears too tenuous a
theory to support such claims. Underlining this doubt, the SEC's
Special Study recommended amending 60e to make reclamation from
bulk segregation explicitly permissible.40
Such an amendment, however, would not solve the additional
problems posed by CCS. Obviously, CCS is not merely an automated
bulk segregation system. Because it serves as a central depository and
clearing agent, the resulting commingling will affect not only fully
paid and margined securities, proprietary and nonproprietary, but also
the securities of many different brokerage firms and their customers.
Although the individual cust6mer's interest will be recorded separately,
such records will soon be maintained not in visually readable form
but rather in some type of random computer storage.41 Thus any right
38 In testifying before an investigating committee, SEC Chairman Cary endorsed the
idea of a reserve requirement, but expressed his opinion that segregation requirements
should be imposed only in the event no other means of protecting free credit balances
proves practicable. See Hearings on H.R. 6789, supra note 5, at 1248. The Special Study
noted that "serious dislocation" would occur from denying brokers access to such funds.
1 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 401.
39 See Hearings on H.R. 6789, supra note 5, at 1147. But cf. COLLIER, supra note 5,
60.74, at 1187 ("this conclusion is not free from doubt").
40 1 SPEci 'STUDY, supra note 1, at 414.
41 CCS utilizes, in its "main line" operation, an IBM 860/50 computer, a 2311 disc
storage unit, two 1403 printers and 10 magnetic tape drives. Letter from Charles F. Lynch,
Secretary of Stock Clearing Corporation, November 26, 1968, on file with the Cornell Law
Review.
Collective customer account information could be fed directly into this or similar
equipment, stored in machine readable language and printed out in the form of individual
visually readable records only upon a programmed request.
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of reclamation based on physical segregation and specific identification
becomes even more attenuated than it was with respect to bulk segre-
gation.
Perhaps the fundamental weakness of 60e in light of current segre-
gation practices and the implementation of CCS is that the same
inequities which the drafters of 60e sought to eliminate among margin
customers now work against cash customers. Violation of segregation
and consent rules can be anticipated, despite the sanctions invoked
thereby, in the panic immediately preceding bankruptcy.42 CCS, at
least as presently contemplated, will serve no regulatory function which
might remedy the situation; the broker will be free to withdraw cus-
tomers' securities from the central depository or pledge them as col-
lateral, and he will maintain the records of their individual accounts.
The probability continues, therefore, that the rules will be violated
under the pressures of impending financial disaster. The result, of
course, is inequality of distribution among customers since reclamation
is based on the entirely fortuitous circumstance of whether or not the
broker has misappropriated all or part of one issue of securities rather
than another.
III
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
A. Distribution of Securities: The Consensual Basis for Treating
the Cash Customer as a Creditor
The foregoing deficiencies, most of which will be aggravated by
the implementation of CCS, indicate that section 60e fails to achieve
its avowed purpose of insuring uniform disposition of bankrupt stock-
brokers' estates based upon fair distribution rather than notions of
legal title. Although reclamation may often be desirable, and perhaps
constitutionally mandatory, 43 it should be strictly circumscribed to
prevent dilution of the distribution to general creditors and other
customers with substantially similar claims. In any case, full compen-
sation should not be conditioned upon the anachronistic concept of
42 "No statute can protect the customer against the dishonest broker who, having
possession of securities registered in 'street name,' sells or pledges them to a bona fide
purchaser in violation of his legal duty." Israels, Article 8-nvestment Securities, 16
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 259 (1951) (footnote omitted).
43 The federal bankruptcy power is subject to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Louisville Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935).
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"finding" physically identifiable property. Similarly, the theory of
ownership which presently supports the cash customer's reclamation
privilege is at best a tenuous justification in view of the realities of
securities transactions and the procedures used in the conduct of
customer accounts.
First, there is good reason for viewing even the cash customer as
a creditor of the bankrupt broker. One of the drafters of 60e observed
that "the so-called 'cash' customer who delivers his security for sale
to the broker and gets caught in a 'last day transaction' has in fact
trusted the general credit of the broker . . . . 44 Moreover, the cash
customer rarely expects to receive a specific certificate,45 but rather
considers all securities of a particular issue to be fungible. Viewed in
this way, the cash customer looks more like a creditor than an owner.
Indeed, the original intent of section 60e was to treat all customers as
creditors4 ---both ease of administration and equality of distribution
result from such treatment.
But there must be some reason why the ownership theory and the
attendant right of reclamation were retained by the Chandler Act with
respect to cash customers. Relegating the cash customer to the same
status as the margin customer is open to at least two objections: Limi-
tations upon the federal bankruptcy power probably preclude arbi-
trarily lumping all customers into a single class of creditors; 47 and
customer confidence may be impaired if no priority in distribution
is accorded the cash customer. As a practical matter, the insecurity
produced by the latter could cause customers to withdraw their se-
curities from CCS in sufficient volume to frustrate the essential purpose
of the system.
However, neither objection would obtain if reasonable priorities
were established which recognized the superior claim of the cash
customer by providing for equitable distribution among a preferred
class of creditors rather than by granting reclamation to a few fortu-
nate owners.48 Present rules requiring the consent of the customer to
44 McLaughlin, supra note 22, at 397.
45 Even if this is not strictly true in the isolated situation where a customer leaves
specific securities with the broker for safekeeping purposes, it is certainly the case where
a customer permits often-traded securities to be registered in street name and held in bulk
segregation or in a central depository.
46 3 CorwR, supra note 5, 60.75, at 1190 n.l.
47 The federal bankruptcy power apparently does not extend to distribution of prop-
erty such as fully paid securities in which the bankrupt has no property interest. Id.
60.73, at 1176.
48 Due process does not bar equal treatment of claimants of the same standing. In re
McMillan, Rapp & Co., 123 F.2d 428, 432 (3d Cir. 1941).
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the broker's use of his securities, and the cash customer's option under
CCS to have his securities withdrawn from the central depository and
segregated for his account, provide a framework for establishing a
system of priorities.
Before a cash customer's securities may be pledged, specific con-
sent must be obtained.49 Where no such consent is granted, and where
the customer specifically requests that his securities be withdrawn from
CCS and segregated in his own name, the proposed amendment should
permit reclamation of the securities regardless of the broker's compli-
ance with the customer's wishes. Under these circumstances, there is
no basis for finding express or implied consent to a waiver of owner-
ship rights. The vast majority of cash customers will not, however,
request that their securities be separated from the mass in the central
depository. They should be deemed to have relied upon the broker's
credit and to have manifested their willingness to share with other
customers similarly situated as tenants in common of the securities
on hand. Provision should therefore be made for these customers to
share as a separate preferred class of creditors in a fund comprised
of their aggregate record holdings. In some cases, fewer securities of
-the issues in which cash customers have an interest will be credited to
the CCS account than the bankrupt broker's records indicate should
be on deposit. Participation in the fund will then be on a pro rata
basis. Because most cash customers are not able to satisfy the identifi-
cation requirements of the present section and are consequently rele-
gated to participation in the "single and separate fund" diluted by
the claims of margin customers, recovery under the proposed amend-
ment will be more favorable.
B. The Margin Customer as a General Creditor
Despite the Chandler Act's rejection of reclamation of margined
securities on the basis of partial ownership, margin customers under
.section 60e enjoy a preferred status vis4-vis general creditors.50 There
is no apparent justification for continuing this priority. Elimination of
other legitimate creditor claims51 from participation in the "single
and separate fund" seems highly inequitable for two reasons: The
margin customer normally knows the risks involved in dealing with
49 2 NYSE GUIDE, supra note 6, 2402(b), (d).
50 Under prior law, the margin customer who was unable to identify his securities
had no better claim than the general creditors.
51 E.g., salary claims, equipment and building rental fees or lease payments, and
unsecured bank obligations. The potential magnitude of the latter is illustrated by the
$18 million in unsecured "day loans" which the Haupt brokerage firm was unable to repay
during the 1963 crisis. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1963, at 27, col. 8.
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the broker as well as the excluded general creditors; 5 2 and the margin
customer generally gives blanket consent to the hypothecation of his
securities 53 -thereby assuming the risk of misappropriation by the
broker. Furthermore, since the margin customer does not have the
right to withdraw his securities from CCS by requesting the issuance
and segregation of specific certificates, there is no danger that the
operation of the new system will be impaired by denying margin
customers distributive priority. Accordingly, the proposed amendment
should give preference only to the claims of cash customers.
C. Distribution of Cash: The Free Credit Balance Problem
CCS is presently only a vehicle for the transfer of securities; cash
in the form of free credit balances will still be held by the broker. For
this reason, and because the reclamation of cash balances is peculiarly
inappropriate even under present practices, 4 the proposed amend-
ment should contain a separate provision to deal with this problem.
Under present section 60e, free credit balances generally fall into
the "single and separate fund" for distribution to all customers who
are unable to reclaim their securities. There is no reason for this.
Participation of customers entitled to free credit balances in the
"single and separate fund" dilutes distribution to other margin and
non-identifying cash customers. Due to the absence of restrictions
upon the use of free credit balances,5 5 cash will rarely be contributed
to the fund. On the other hand, should there be credit balances avail-
able for distribution, there is no reason why margin customers should
have any claim thereto. Since cash is not identifiable property, there
is no justification for separating it from the general estate of the
bankrupt or for preferring free credit balance claimants to general
creditors on the basis of ownership.56 Moreover, the person who leaves
52 The small investor cash customer, on the other hand, may often not be financially
knowledgeable.
53 1 SPECAL STuDY, supra note 1, at 390-91.
54 3 Coiuna, supra note 5, 60.75, at 1192 & n.11.
55 Under the laws of some of the States, specific restrictions do exist upon the
manner in which customers' free credit balances may be held. For example,
Iowa requires that customers' free credit balances be segregated from firm ac-
counts. Ohio requires that customers' free credit balances be segregated if the
net capital of a broker-dealer falls below $10,000 or his "total indebtedness"
exceeds 15 times his "net worth." Apart from State law, however, there are no
direct restrictions on the manner in which customers' free credit balances are held
and used by broker-dealers.
1 SFcuML STUDy, supra note 1, at 400 (footnotes omitted).
56 Of course a balancing of policies is involved. If, as a policy matter, it is good to
promote cash balances, then they should be protected. If the policy is to promote with-
drawal of idle funds from brokerage houses, then they should not be protected. The
importance of cash balances to the industry would seem to tip the balance in favor of
the former.
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his cash with a brokerage firm is ultimately trusting the broker's credit.
The proposed amendment, therefore, should assign general creditor
status to free credit balance claimants.
CONCLUSION
There is no entirely satisfactory solution to the problem of dis-
tributions in stockbrokerage bankruptcies. The best result involves
spreading the inevitable losses among as many creditors as possible.
To this end, the amendment proposed herein has grudgingly preferred
the cash customer, solely on the policy of sustaining confidence in the
CCS. 57
John L. C. Black
57 Ultimately the only truly effective remedy will be to provide preventive measures
outside of § 60e. The comparatively unregulated use of the cash surplus in customer accounts
makes increased protection of cash balances essential. As an alternative to undesired segrega-
tion requirements, the NYSE has considered the voluntary establishment of a reserve fund to
reimburse free credit balances losses. See NYSE President Funston's statement in Hearings
on H.R. 6789, supra note 5, at 1093. This would place the burden of maintaining investor
confidence in free credit balances on the industry, where it belongs, and not on assorted
creditors. Following the Ira Haupt debacle, a $25 million fund was created. See N. MrAXs,
Tsn GREAT SALAD OIL SwINDLE 232 (1966). However, in order to avoid the self-imposed
role of insurer, the Exchange has repeatedly disclaimed any acceptance of an implied
obligation, from its liquidation of the Haupt firm and reimbursement of its customers, to
guarantee all customer losses in the event of a member firm's insolvency. Hearings on
HR. 6789, supra, at 1139.
Another alternative is the liquidity requirement such as that suggested by the SEC's
Special Study:
It would seem desirable that broker-dealers . . . be required to maintain
reserves of cash or Government obligations equal to a percentage of free credit
balances. Although the question of percentage may be left for future determina-
tion, it would appear that a reserve requirement of about 15 percent would be
feasible, would bear some relation to the requirements of Federal law for banks
and would force broker-dealers to maintain themselves in a more liquid status
than some do now.
1 SaEcAL STuDY, supra note 1, at 401.
